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THE INFORMER'S PRIVILEGE: SHOULD IT BE RECOGNIZED IN
GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS; SHOULD IT BE EXTENDED TO
CIVIC ANTI-CRIME ORGANIZATIONS?
Law enforcement agencies often rely upon
informer's reports as a basis for investigation
or the arrest of a person accused of a crime.'
Although it is a citizen's moral duty to report
violations of the law, the informer demands the
assurance of some protection, for he fears that
disclosure of his identity may expose him or
his family to retaliatory action for what he has
made known.2 As a result the courts have long
recognized, as an evidentiary rule, the privilege
of government officials to withhold the identity
of their informers. 3 It is not clear, however,
whether the informer's privilege extends to
grand jury proceedings, and, of equal importance, whether courts (or legislatures) should
extend this privilege to investigating officers
I See HOPKINS, OuR LAWLESS POLICE (1931);
Donnelly, Jvdicial Control of Informants, Spies,
Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE
L.J. 1091 (1951); Hoover, A Comment on the Artile "Loyalty Among Government Employees," 58
YALE L.. 401 (1949).
See Comments, Some Aspects of Competency and
Privileged Communications in The FederalCriminal
Courts, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 719, 730 (1950); An
Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicialand Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953). The
dangers involved are best illustrated by the death
of Arnold Schuster. Shortly after New York police
disclosed that his information led to the arrest of
bank robber Willie Sutton, Schuster, the informant,
was mysteriously slain. N. Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1952,
p. 1, col. two; id., March 9, 1952, p. 1, col. 8.
38 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940).
"This privilege is well established, and its soundness cannot be questioned."

of private civic anti-crime groups appearing in
grand jury or court proceedings.
Both of these novel problems were raised in
the cases of It re Kohn 4 and People v. Kcating.5
In each case a member of a civic crime committee was cited for contempt of court for
refusing to disclose the source of his information before a grand jury conducting a parallel
investigation. However, neither court specifically passed upon the question of the availa6
bility of this privilege before the grand jury.
4277 La. 245, 79 S. 2d 81 (1955).
'286 App. Div. 150, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st
Dep't 1955).
6 In the Keating case, the court recognized the
existence of the informer's privilege, but refused
to extend it to the counsel of a private organization,
in the absence of any statute specifically allowing
the court to do so.
The prevailing members of the court in the Kohn
case did not meet the issue of whether the privilege
was available in grand jury hearings-instead, they
apparently refused to acknowledge this evidentiary
rule even in courts of law. On the other hand the
decision may be grounded upon an interpretation
of the ordinance which authorized the creation of
the investigating committee. However, the concurring opinion recognized the validity of the privilege in the courts, but specifically held that it could
not be invoked before grand juries. A dissenting
judge argued that this privilege was firmly established. Furthermore, because the language of the
municipal ordinance which created this quasi-public
committee was not antagonistic to the privilege,
the dissenting judge felt Kohn had sufficient official
status to remain silent before the grand jury.
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Yet both legal and policy reasons support the
argument that if the informer's privilege is
worthy of recognition in courts of law, it should
also be extended to grand jury proceedings.

rights of confrontation and due process in
courts of law.

2

THE PRIVILEGE BEFORE THE
GRA

THE PRIVILEGE BEFORE THE CouRTs
Courts which recognize the informer's privilege afford it a varying breadth of application;
7
some safeguard only the informer's identity,
while others will, in addition, protect the communication itself.8 However, even under the
view which advocates shielding only the informer's identity, the contents of the communication are generally also held to be privileged
if their disclosure would reveal the informer's
identity. 9 Under neither view is it considered
to be an absolute privilege: if the informer's
identity is already known the privilege is not
available, 0 and if the identity of the informer
is necessary to the accused's defense in a criminal proceeding the court will require disclosure," since the public interest in acquitting
the innocent is deemed to override the public
benefit derived from shielding the informer's
identity. A further basis for the latter qualification is found in the accused's constitutiona1
7E.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251
(1938). Accord, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (3d
ed. 1940). UNIFORm Rm.Es OF EvIDENcE rule 36
(1942).
8
E.g., Wells v. Toogood, 165 Mich. 677, 131

N.W. 124 (1911); Michael v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360,
105 Pac. 537 (1909).
9 E.g., People v. Laird, 102 Mich. 135, 60 N.W.
457 (1894); McCoPcMC, EVrDENcE § 148 (1954).
'0 McCoRMxicK, EVIDENCE § 148 (1954): "[It is
obviousl that when the identity has already become
known to those who would have cause to resent the

communication, the privilege ceases." E.g., Commonwealth v. Congdon, 265 Mass. 166, 175, 165
N.E. 467, 470 (1928) (voluntary confession of a

crime).
" E.g., Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390

(3d Cir. 1932); United States v. Keown, 19 F.
Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937). For criminal cases
sustaining the nondisclosure of the informer's

identity on the theory that it was not essential to
the accused's defense, see Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938) and United States v. Li Fat
Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945).
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JURY

Apparently the only privileges presently recognized before both courts and grand juries
13
are the privileges against self-incrimination,
against revealing state secretse 4 and against
disclosure of communications between attorney and client. 5 In addition to the constitu"2See Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against The
Production of Data Within The Control of Executive
Departments, 3 VAo. L. REv. 73, 77 (1949) and
Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial
and Adininistrath'eProceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206,
212-13 (1953). The Sixth Amendment guarantees
the accused's right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and reserves to him the right
of cross-examination. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment restricts the national government from depriving any person of his due process rights while
the Fourteenth Amendment protects any person
from state interference with these rights.
"3Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562
(1892) and State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 72, 9 A.2d
63, 69 (1939) hold that the privilege to refuse to
answer incriminating questions exists before grand
juries. A minority of courts also recognize a second
aspect of the privilege against self-incriminationthe right of the accused to refuse to take the stand
in criminal prosecutions, as existing before grand
juries. State ex rel. Poach v. Sly, 63 S.D. 162, 257
N.W. 113 (1934), People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div.
665, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133 (lst Dep't 1908). However,
a majority of the courts, under the theory that a
grand jury hearing is not a "criminal prosecution"
and that there is no "accused," have held that this
second aspect of the self-incrimination privilege
does not exist before investigatory bearings of grand
juries. In re Lemon, 15 Cal. App.2d 82, 59 P.2d 231
(1936); O'Connel v. United States, 40 F.2d 201
(2d Cir. 1930); Ex parte Barnes, 73 Tex. Crim. 583,
166 S.W. 728 (1914).
'1 Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa. 433 (1877).
I5Ex parle McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 Pac.
566 (1915) (an attorney is privileged to refuse to
disclose the identity of his client to the grand jury).
People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail
of New York County, 150 Misc. 714,270 N.Y. Supp.
363 (Sup. Ct. 1934), which recognized the availability
of the attorney-client privilege before the grand
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tional mandate, a strong emotional feeling
against inquisitional tactics appears to be a
factor which gives support to the extention of
the self-incrimination privilege to all official
hearings where persons are called upon to give
testimony.' 6 Furthermore, the importance of
national security would seem to be a controlling
factor, not present when considering the informer's privilege, in justifying extention of the
state secret privilege to grand juries 7 But
although there is greater justification for extending the self-incrimination and state secret
privileges to grand juries, there does not seem
to be any compelling reason why the informer's
privilege should not be given recognition at
least coextensive with that afforded the attorney-client privilege. Public policy considerations underlying the latter are no more forceful
than those underlying the former, for both
privileges are primarily grounded upon a desire
to foster a full disclosure between the parties.18
jury as to communications. However, the identity
of the client was held not to be privileged and was
required to be divulged. Cf. In re Selser, 15 N.J.
393, 105 A.2d 395 (1954). Although the court apparently acknowledged the existence of the attorney-client privilege before the grand jury, the
communication was made in furtherance of a crime
and was not privileged.
In addition, on a motion to quash an indictment
it was held to be error for the grand jury to admit
testimony shielded by the marital privilege. State
v. Marshall, 140 Minn. 363, 168 N.W. 174 (1918).
16Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562
(1892); McCoRMcK, EvIDENCE §§ 120, 122 and
12317(1954).
1t has been held that communications from
an informer to a government official may also be
protected by the state secret privilege. Worthington
v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872); cf. King v.
United States, 112 Fed. 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1902);
Krumin v. Bruknes, 255 11. App. 503, 509 (1930).
But the state secret privilege should apply only
when national security would otherwise be jeopardized; it appears improper to classify the ordinary
informer's identity or his communication as a state
secret.
"8It should be noted that if the government
official to whom the informer communicated his
message is an attorney, the attorney-client privilege
may provide a basis for an alternate theory that

In addition to the foregoing consideration of
analogous privileges, 9 important policy arguments are persuasive bases for extension of the
informer's privilege to be invoked in grand
can be relied upon to protect the informer's identity.
Vogel v. Gruas, 110 U.S. 311 (1884); Ratzlaff v.
State, 122 Okla. 263, 249 Pac. 934 (1926); Gabriel
v. McMullin, 127 Iowa 426, 103 N.W. 355 (1905).
Contra, Vernon v. State, 49 Ga. App. 187, 174 S.E.
548 (1934). Cf. Granger v. Warrington, 8 I1. 299
(1846) (the privilege was denied, however, as the
identity of the informer was already known). The
approach that recognizes nondisclosure based upon
the attorney-client theory would seem to be unsound, for the latter privilege is sustained in order
to protect a private relationship. This interest is

not present when the lawyer is acting in the role of
a public official. Also, the attorney-client privilege
traditionally protects the contents of the communi-

cation and not the identity of the client, so again,
the analogy fails to be compelling. For cases holding

that the identity of the client is not privileged see
Chirac v. Reinicker, 11 Wheat. 280, 284 (U.S.
1826); People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County
Jail of New York County, 150 Misc. 714. 270 N.Y.
Supp. 363 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Contra, Elliot v. United
States, 23 D.C. App. 456, 467 (1904); Ex parte
McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 Pac. 566 (1915).

8 WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

§ 2313 (3d ed. 1940) suggests

there are exceptional circumstances where the
identity of the client will be considered part of the
confidental communication, i.e., the facts of each
case control.
19A further analogy may be drawn from a typical
state "official communication" statute. E.g., IOWA
CODE ANN. § 622.11 (1950): "A public officer cannot
be examined as to communications made to him
in official confidence, when the public interest
would suffer by the disclosure."
In addition, California, Idaho, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota and Washington have enacted
these statutes. Georgia has a similar provision.
Upon the basis of such a statute the informer's communication was protected in State v. McClendon,
172 Minn. 106, 214 N.W. 782 (1927) and Anderson
v. State, 72 Ga. App. 487, 34 S.E. 2d 110 (1945).
However, it may be doubtful that government officials could withhold the identity of informers, since
the statutes only refer to "communications."
Quaere: Could the disclosure of his identity, by an
informer to a government official, be a "communication" within the spirit and language of the statute?
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jury proceedings to the same degree as before
courts of law. Even though the secrecy of grand
20
jury hearings is guarded by statute, it is unfortunate that as a practical matter, the proceedings are often far from secret.2 1 Thus, if
the informer has reason to believe that his
identity may be disclosed it will have a deterrent effect upon his willingness to inform. And
discouraging the informer will necessarily have
a prejudicial effect upon effective police investigation of criminal violations, the basic consideration underlying the ancient informer's
privilege.n
Just as in courts of law, to the extent that
the shielding of an informer encroaches upon
the fundamental rights of an accused, a persuasive argument is made for denying any informer's privilege before grand jury proceedings. 3 However, since an accused's rights are
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not guarded before the grand jury to the extent
that they are in courts of law, he would gain
little benefit, if any, by disclosure of the informer's identity before the grand jury. At the
present time a person has no right of crossexamination or of confrontation when being
investigated or indicted by a grand jury.U The
denial of these rights, the denial of right to
counsel and the use of normally inadmissible
evidence in grand jury proceedings are held
not to violate the accused's constitutional right
25
of due process.
The foregoing considerations favor allowing
government officials to withhold the identity of
their informers from the grand jury, both in
investigatory and indictment proceedings, inasmuch as this privilege is firmly established
26
in courts of law.
THE PRIVILEGE AND Civic ANi'I-CRIME

The analogy is weakened, however, by the indication that these statutes merely codify the existing state secret and informer's privileges. State v.
Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 Pac. 1000 (1909). See also
Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its LIse in Judicial
and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206,
219 (1953) and 8 WiGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2374
(3d ed. 1940).
20 E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38 § 720 (1955): "No
grand juror... or other person shall disclose...
nor shall any grand juror during his term of service
communicate with any person concerning any
matter which the jury has considered, is considering or is about to consider .... Whoever violates
this section shall be imprisoned for not more than
one year."
21 Miller, Informations or Indictments in Felony
Cases, 8 MINN. L. REv. 379, 389 (1924); Comment.
The Grand Jury (Specific Reference To Illinois), 44
J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 49 (1953).
2 The first reported case which recognized the
informer's privilege was Rex v. Akers, 6 Esp. 127,
170 Eng. Rep. 850 (1790). For an exhaustive historical development see WIGMORE, op. cit. supra
note 3 and Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use
in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings. 63
YALE L.J. 206, 209 (1953).
23Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir.
1932); United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639
(W.D. Ky. 1937). Accord, Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938); United States v. Li Fat Tong.
152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945).

ORGANIZATIONS

To invoke the privilege of nondisclosure in
courts of law, the person in whom the confidence is placed is required to be a public official,
acting in the performance of his duties.n If an
anti-crime group is created by state statute to
be the investigating arm of the legislature,
then, as public officers, they would be entitled
21Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199 (10th
Cir. 1942). The court held that the inquiry made
hy the grand jury was not a criminal prosecution
within the purview of the Sixth Amendment. See
note 12 supra.
25 U.S. v. Costello. 221 F.2d 668, 677 (2d Cir.
1955) (hearsay evidence held sufficient to support
an indictment); In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir.
1931) (witness before grand jury is not entitled to
aid of counsel); People v. Barbour, 152 Misc. 39,
273 N.Y. Supp. 788 (Ct. of Gen. Sess. 1934) (since
a grand jury serves merely an accusatory function
it was held unwise to invoke technical rules of
evidencel.
2G For a thorough analysis of the powers of a
grand jury see Comment. The Grand Jury-Its investi.,atory Powers and Limitations, 37 MINN. L.
REV. 586 (1953); The Grand Jury (Special Reference
To Illinois), 44 J. CRIM. L.. C. & P.S. 49 (1953);
Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Porwers,
17 F.R.D. 331 (1955).
27 See note 3 supra.
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to remain silent. A group whose creation is
authorized by municipal ordinance to investigate corruption in a given community is farther
removed from the necessary degree of official
status required to sustain a reliance upon the
informer's privilege. However, depending upon
how broadly the ordinance delegated governmental functions, this quasi-public organization could logically be permitted to shield the
identity of its informers behind the privilege.s
But if the crime commission has a wholly private status, without any governmental authorization or control over its membership, activities, or the selection of its staff, it seems clear
that special investigators hired by this private
group would not have the requisite official
status to invoke the common law privilege.
Since privately financed and operated civic
organizations (and in addition, some quasipublic groups) do not fall within the traditional
scope of the privilege, a recent congressional
inquiry has sought to determine the need for
legislation to extend this rule of nondisclosure
to officers and directors of civic groups.n Legislatures, in evaluating whether there is any need
for another statutory privilege, must ascertain
whether the work of citizen organizations will
be more effective with such legislation or
whether the alleged need for this privilege is
only illusory.
2

1 E.g., the majority and dissent in the Kohn
case differed on this very point. Ordinance No.
18,531, section 5, of the City of New Orleans, in
describing the reporting duty of the investigative
committee, reads: ". . . Such reports shall first be
delivered to the ... Grand Jury... for such action
as that body shall consider proper."
The majority of the court did not feel that this
language permitted the invocation of this privilege
before the grand jury.
29 Senator Estes Kefauver, who has urged the
formation of citizens crime commissions, recently
introduced a resolution in Congress to study the
extent to which officers of anti-crime civic organizations may be required to divulge confidential sources
of information. S. Rzs. 91, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
101 CONG. REc. 3826 (daily ed. April 18, 1955).
This resolution was referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee "to conduct an immediate study and
report promptly to the Senate body."

Civic crime commissions are not organized
to duplicate the work of any department of
the government; nor are they formed to apprehend or prosecute criminals. Instead, they seek
by observation and investigation to determine
why crime flourishes and prosecutions lag.30
Some merely gather statistics and data, but
the majority report to the public when there
are indications of lax and inefficient law enforcement. From their nature and function it
is reasonable to propose that civic anti-crime
groups should, when possible, limit their use of
informers to obtaining leads for investigating
unlawful activity. Because of their notoriously
untrustworthy character, information from informants should be painstakingly checked for
accuracy. If each crime committee is able to
verify this data before publishing it, there
would be no need for a privilege of nondisclosure. Facts independently corroborated by resourceful investigation could then be presented
to the public, to local police or to the grand
jury, as the organization's own.n
However, these considerations are not relevant in determining whether or not the civic
groups should also be required to disclose the
identity of undercover agents who either initially discover the information or verify the informer's disclosure. These investigators, many
of them formerly with the FBI, would be of
no use in further investigations after their
identity was disclosed.n Contrasted to an in30The Chicago Crime Commission was the first
effective organization of its kind. For a discussion
of its creation and aims see Sims, Fighting Crime
in Chckago: The Crime Commission, 11 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 21 (1920). For an exhaustive analysis
of these citizen's groups see Peterson, CWiizens Crime

Commissions, 17 FED. PROB. 9 (1953).
31

Boudin v. Dulles, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1955,
p. 12, col. 3 (D.D.C. 1955) (memorandum opinion,
Youngdahl, J.). "Confidential information is of unquestionable importance to executive officers in performing their duties, but it should be confined for
use in obtaining factual data which may itself be
used of record." Id. col. 5.
3 The FBI itself is often faced with this very
problem.

"BARTH, THE LoYALTY o

FREE MEN

164 (1951) comments: "[In the Judith Coplon 1949
espionage trial] it embarrassed the government...
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former, an undercover agent usually does not
fear retaliation. Instead, his fear is grounded
primarily upon a destruction of his livelihood.
For this reason grand juries, as a practical
matter, often yield in their quest for the agent's
identity, and instead, settle for the testimony
of officers and directors of these groups.
POSSIBLE STATUTORY TREATMENT

Some of the problems involved in extending
the informer's privilege to private persons were
examined by states which considered statutes
that would grant a similar immunity to newsmen. ' Such statutes were necessary if a newsman's privilege was warranted, since traditional
concepts of privileged communications unquestionably demanded that newsmen disclose the
identity of the source of their information.
These statutes have been criticized on the
ground that the public interest in guaranteeing
better news reporting is not better served by
fostering a confidential relationship between
reporters and their informants.M The effect of
because publication of the FBI files may have revealed the identity of certain confidential and
stratgically placed informants-a high price to
pay for the punishment of a young woman who had
cese(l to be a danger as soon as her espionage activities had been discovered . .."
x Alabama, Arizonia, Arkansas, California,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey have adopted
statutes extending some sort of privilege to newsmen. However, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin have rejected similar statutes.
It should also be noted that other statutes have
extended privileges to communications to some
private professional groups. E.g., Georgia protects
accountants, a Virginia statute applies to brokers
and Oregon has enacted a statute to protect communications to stenographers.
34Wigmore, in his earlier treatise, commenting on
the 1896 Maryland statute-the first newsman
confidence statute-said: "The following enactment,
as detestable in substance as it is crude in form,
will probably remain unique." 5 WiGmORE, EviDENCE § 2286. n.7 (2d ed. 1923). See Notes, The
Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the
Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REv. 61
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the newsmen statutes is to raise the newsman
to the level of a public official. Quaere: Whether
the interest of the community has really thereby
been subordinated to the interest of a relatively small professional class. Prior litigation
has demonstrated that because of a rigid canon
of the journalistic code of ethics, even without
a statute, the newsman will accept the penalty
of contempt rather than disclose his source of
information. 35 If his efforts to report all the
news does benefit the general public a strong
argument can be made for the position that he
should not be subject to contempt for such a
refusal. 6 However, it would seem that the
newsman's primary interest in obtaining a
statutory privilege is to gain a personal advantage, e.g., the obtaining of an exclusive
story by nondisclosure of his informant to
public officials, which seems to lead to the
conclusion that the newsman benefits from
these statutes rather than the general public.
The scope of newsmen confidence statutes
varies from state to state. A proposed New
York statute qualified the privilege to the ex(1950); Gallup, Further Consideration of a Privilege
for Newsmen, 14 ALBANY L. REv. 16 (1950). Contra.
Desmond, The Newsmen's Privilege Bill, 13 ALBANY

L. REv. 1 (1949).
35Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781
(1911); People ex rd. Mooney v. Sherrif, 269 N.Y.
291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). See note 34 supra.
36Newsmen contend that the public interest in
better news reporting will be fostered by these
statutes, i.e., the newsman will be free tc expose
corruption without fear of citation for contempt.
Motivations for abuse of such statutes are admittedly present. For example, a reporter may withhold information (which law enforcement officials
should have) in order to keep 'open' an exclusive
story, or for some personal reasons not consistent
with the public interest. Manifestly, however, it
cannot be contended that all newsmen who have
suffered imprisonment in lieu of disclosing a confidential source of information have been motivated
by considerations inconsistent with furtherance of
the public interest. This being so, there is no public
policy which would support penalizing a newsman
for promoting the public interest, recognizing that
his actions incidently also benefit his occupational
position.
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tent that the reporter could disclose the source
of his information in his discretion, yet he
could not be compelled to do so unlcss the
court found the disclosure was essential to the
public interest.Y The latter qualification would
seem to be the only way in which a legislature
would be justified in extending a privilege of
nondisclosure to civic anti-crime organizations.
Such a flexible and contingent limitation probably would not deter informers; nor would it
discourage the use of undercover agents by the
organization. However, this discretionary qualification would seem to be burdensome upon
the trial courts, inasmuch as "public interest"
is not susceptible of precise definition.
Moreover, there are other overriding considerations. It is conceivable that an informer's
privilege statute could be used by an unscrupulous investigator to operate a purportedly
reputable anti-crime endeavor and in this way
threaten officials with public disclosure of fictitious informer's information, always under
the shield of a statute which would compel
disclosure only after the exercise of a value
judgment by a trial court judge of what is
"in the public interest." By contrast, however,
those public officials who warrant attack often
criticize the source of such an attack to harass
and thus negate the effectiveness of the civic
organizations, and have the additional purpose
of forcing disclosure of the identity of the
informer in order to retaliate against him.
The public interest would not be benefited
greatly by statutory protection of these civic
groups. In thosefew instances where informer's
leads could not be verified by the organization,
a statute would protect a-private anti-crime
group from harassment;3s but the work of these
citizen organizations would not be .far more
effective with such legislation. Furthermore, it
" Law Revision Commission Report, Leg. Doc.
No. 65(A) (1949). See also People v. Keating, 286
App. Div. 150, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st Dep't 1955).
31E.g., an informer may be a witness to, or participant in, the bribing of a civic official. The informer's observation could be the only evidence of
that illegal transaction. By contrast, the report of
the existence of a gambling establishment could
easily be verified for authenticity.

also would be impractical for legislatures to
extend the informer's privilege so that civic
anti-crime groups could refuse to reveal the
identity of their undercover agents. There
would be no way for a court to ascertain
whether the civic group's information was
from an undercover agent or an informer.
Therefore, unscrupulous anti-crime organizations, who are not subject to the control of a
responsible superior, could gain the benefits
of such a statute merely by telling the court
that the informer's information was the product of capable undercover work. Therefore, in
balancing the considerations previously set
forth, a statute would not seem justified.
CONCLUSION

In summary, the courts should allow an
extension of the informer's privilege in grand
jury proceedings to the same extent that it is
recognized when government officials appear as
witnesses before courts of law. On the other
hand, full consideration compels the conclusion
that neither the courts nor the legislatures
should allow private anti-crime groups to refuse
to disclose the identity of their informers. The
results of such a conclusion may appear harsh
at first, since private investigators and officers
of these anti-crime commissions must reveal
the source of their information or face punishment for contempt. However, the interest of
the public will be better served without any
statutory protection inasmuch as civic anticrime commissions will then be compelled to
gather a sufficient amount of probative evidence, independent of the informer's disclosure,
before making their charges. In those few instances where this would not be possible it
would devolve upon the civic group to balance
the severity of the crime against the possible
loss of undercover agents or the discouragement of informers. In doing so, the organizations, which through previous work have established a good reputation in the community,
will know that they will often be successful in
convincing a grand jury, as a practical matter.

